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HOW CAN THE LOGGERHEAD SEA-TURTLE SURVIVE?  





The endangered loggerhead sea-turtle (Caretta caretta) nests on the shores of the Mediterranean, 
but faces threats to its existence from a variety of sources. Answering the question of how this species 
can survive is complex as it involves examining the relationships between the turtle, its natural 
environment, local tourists, property developers, conservation organisations, governments and law-
makers. We argue that actor-network theory (ANT) provides a powerful methodology for tracing these 
relations and identifying crucial actors which enable the survival of this animal. Using a rich 
ethnography and drawing on insights from 116 interviews, we trace three actor-networks that 
highlight factors important to the survival of the species. Yet, we also highlight the conceptual 
difficulties that result from using an ANT ontology for understanding socio-ecological interactions and 
argue that these may be ameliorated by embedding the ANT methodology within a critical realist (CR) 
ontology. We argue that this engagement between CR and ANT offers researchers a powerful method 
for understanding relations between socio-ecological actors whilst overcoming some of the 
theoretical difficulties of ANT. 
 
Introduction 
In reacting to Judeo-Christian anthropocentric ‘othering’ of animals, post-Enlightenment thinking has 
developed a range of philosophical positions that not only provide critical perspectives on animal 
rights, husbandry, experimentation and genomics (Haraway, 2008; McCance, 2013; Sage et al., 2016) 
but also, in reconstructing the human as animal, call into question assumptions concerning human 
rights, free-will and consciousness (Steiner, 2013). In focusing on human-animal relations, here 
contextualised as ‘socio-ecological’, such developments are intrinsically philosophical - they prompt 
questions of ontology (what are humans and animals?), epistemology (how do humans know, 
construct, and study animals?) and ethics (do animals and humans have any, or similar rights?). 
Answering such questions has prompted an engagement with radical theories of the social world 
which seek to avoid both the anthropocentricism of many humanist accounts and the positivism of 




Two alternatives to traditional ‘scientistic’ (Fleetwood, 2005) approaches can be found in actor-
network theory (ANT), and critical realism (CR). ANT challenges traditional dualities of society / nature 
and agency / structure by proposing a ‘flat’ actualist ontology which prioritises the constructive effects 
of empirical networks between human and non-human actors and rejecting the essentialisms 
associated with the natural sciences (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 2007). CR, on the other hand, 
proposes a ‘depth’ ontology which commits to emergence and stratification (Bhaskar, 1979), as well 
as a ‘moderate essentialism’ (Sayer, 2000: 97) in recognising that entities possess inherent properties 
and (potential) powers (Fleetwood, 2005). Both have proved increasingly popular critical approaches 
to understanding relations between the natural, material and social, but both have also been 
critiqued. Concerning CR, one criticism has argued that it has over-emphasised human agency and the 
‘invisible’ domain of the real (e.g. social structures) at the expense of the empirical, the material and 
the non-human (Reeves, 2011). With rare exceptions (e.g. Benton, 1993; Dickens, 1992), CR’s focus 
on the human has caused a neglect of ecology and animals in social accounts. For ANT, critique has 
often come from the opposite direction – that the empirical is over-emphasised to the extent that it 
can ‘lead to the production of simply more or less interesting stories….with the fading of context into 
the background’ (Mutch, 2006: 239). Moreover, concerns about the ontological commitments of ANT 
have been raised from outside and within ANT. Indeed, we frame this paper, in part, as a response to 
calls from its founders to develop ANT without ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ (Callon and 
Latour, 1992: 369; also see, Callon, 1999; Latour, 2007).  
 
In this paper, using the case of Caretta caretta sea-turtle conservation in the Mediterranean, we argue 
that ANT provides a powerful methodology to understand socio-ecological relations, and provides 
counter-intuitive insights about the relations between empirical actors. However, we also illustrate 
four limitations of ANT in providing an adequate answer to the question of how the Caretta caretta 
can survive, and argue that these can be ameliorated by embedding the ANT methodology within an 
alternative CR ontology. The opportunities for a potential engagement between ANT and CR were 
sketched out in a theoretical article by Mutch (2002) which argued that, in future research, ‘of most 
importance [in CR-ANT engagement] might be the incorporation of non-humans into the analysis of 
social interaction’ (p.493). Yet, subsequent analyses have not only remained theoretical, but have 
tended to focus on human-human relationships (e.g. Elder‐Vass, 2008; 2015) rather than exploring 
the role of non-human actors, especially animals. Moreover, studies in this area since Mutch (2002) 
have tended to find little of value in ANT itself - with Elder-Vass (2015) recommending ‘abandoning’ 
ANT in favour of CR. Thus, there is an opportunity to respond to Mutch’s call for deeper, and preferably 
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empirical, exploration of the possibilities of an engagement between ANT and CR, especially in a field 
where non-human actors may play a significant role. 
 
This paper, therefore, explores the potential of an ANT-CR engagement in the context of a socio-
ecological case-study of the conservation of the Caretta caretta: an endangered species of sea-turtle 
which nests on the beaches of the Mediterranean. The question we ask is how can the Caretta caretta 
survive? A fundamentally important question (not least to the actor that is the sea-turtle), but also 
one which requires, as we shall see, an answer (and thus a theory) that can cut across socio-ecological 
boundaries, and recognise the role of a variety of actors, including the turtle itself, which influence its 
existence. The difficulty many disciplines face is that they tend to stop at the boundary, with the 
natural sciences reluctant to engage with sociological issues, and mainstream sociology traditionally 
wary of the natural (Benton, 1993). To address our question, therefore, we draw on ANT, which has 
been used in a variety of studies of the socio-ecological (Callon, 1986; Thompson, 2011; Latour et al., 
1993; Castree, 2005; Law and Mol, 2008). Our analysis highlights the contested enactment of the 
turtles in three competing and inter-related actor-networks: the development network which 
concerns the growth of local tourism and the associated building developments; the scientific network 
which is focused on the measurement and reporting of turtle numbers; and the reproductive network, 
which concerns the life-cycle of the turtle itself as it hatches, matures, mates, nests, lays eggs, and 
dies.  
 
Empirically, the ANT method generates powerful insights concerning the contested enactment of the 
turtle, the enrolment of key actors, and the agency of non-humans. However, theoretically, we show 
how ANT’s ontological commitments generate difficulties concerning identifying network boundaries, 
explaining regularities, and understanding absences. We argue that these limitations can be alleviated 
by using the emergent, stratified ontology offered by CR. This contribution builds upon existing work 
which engages CR and ANT (Mutch 2002; Elder-Vass 2008; 2015) in three ways. First, we provide the 
first empirical illustration of the potential of an ANT-CR rapprochement - in our case, for 
understanding socio-ecology. Second, we develop new critiques of ANT from a realist perspective, 
especially concerning its theorisation of absences. Finally, we show how, using abduction and 







Understanding the socio-natural: the possibilities of ANT and CR 
The potential of ANT 
 
By dislodging human agency from its dominant position in social theorising, promoting an explicitly 
non-structuralist account of social change, and empirically describing how taken-for-granted ‘objects’ 
are institutionalised (or ‘black-boxed’), Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has provided a radical challenge 
to both anthropocentric and structural theorising (Callon, 1986; 1987)1. Its ontology rejects social 
structures or invisible mechanisms in favour of a commitment to actualism (Harman 2009: 16): 
following an empirical network of events occurring in local contexts (Latour, 1987). Indeed, ANT 
rejects a priori theorising in favour of ‘following the actors’ (Sayes 2014; Callon and Latour 1992). The 
ontology is also explicitly relational, indeterminate and anti-essentialist: ‘entities take their form and 
acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with other entities….entities have no inherent 
qualities’ (Law, 1999: 3). Whilst ontologically committing to a form of actualist realism (events and 
their relations exist in the empirical world, but that is all), ANT is epistemologically constructivist, in 
that whilst real objects exist ‘out there’ they come into being through the practices of science (Latour 
and Woolgar, 1986: 182). 
 
Actors are the ‘prime movers’ of ANT, and are inextricable from the networks of which they are part.  
In line with the anti-essentialist commitment of ANT, actors take their attributes as a ‘result of their 
relations with other entities’ in the network (Law, 1999), ‘as neither the actor's size nor its 
psychological make-up nor the motivations behind its actions are predetermined’ (Callon, 1999: 181-
182). The point here isn’t that animals are different to what we assume they are, but that they and 
any other actors - human, animal, or otherwise - are enacted only and always in the instant of the 
network. In this respect, ‘ANT presents a coherent methodology for incorporating non-humans into 
social scientific accounts’ (Sayes, 2014: 135). For example, Law and Mol (2008: 59) emphasise that ‘in 
each of these practices a sheep is something different’, whilst Law and Lien (2012: 363) argue that 
salmon are only what ‘come to be in a relational, multiple, fluid, and more or less unordered and 
indeterminate (set of) specific and provisional practices’ (Law and Lien, 2012: 365). Moreover, this 
definition is not only ecumenical – actors may be germs, scallops, or humans – but also, crucially, 
symmetrical, as it is the network which lends properties and powers. The ‘general symmetry principle’ 
of ANT regards both ‘nature and society as twin results of….network building’, which should 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that ANT is a broad church and there is much variation and debates within the ANT 
community. However, as we shall see, varieties of ANT tend to differ on their ‘domain level’ theorising rather 
than their ontological commitments.  
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subsequently be approached with the same methodological and ontological assumptions (Callon and 
Latour, 1992: 348). 
 
ANT theorists hold that the only connections that matter are the practices within an empirical network 
of events (Latour, 1993: 117). When actor-networks act as a unified whole, they can become taken-
for-granted assumptions, scientific ‘facts’, or institutionalised social mores, what ANT terms ‘black-
boxing’ (Latour and Woolgar, 1986). Another feature of the network is its translation effects. 
Translation is the process by which ‘the identity of actors, the possibility and the margins of 
manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited’ (Callon, 1986: 222) within the network: in short, those 
seeking to enrol actors into a network do so by creating obligatory points of passage through which 
the network is routed. This is sometimes achieved by establishing oneself as a central actor in the 
network or by using interessement devices (e.g. technology, experimental apparatus) which prevent 
actors from ‘engaging’ with competing networks.  
 
For those academics interested in human engagement with animals, and non-humans more generally, 
Latour’s relational ontology provides significant resources: the insistence on agentic symmetry, the 
anti-essentialism of the network, and its anti-structuralist actualism not only de-centre the human 
from its traditional dominance in explanatory social science, but also help open up the ‘black box’ that 
is the scallop (Callon, 1986), microbe (Latour et al., 1993), horse (Thompson, 2011), sheep (Law and 
Mol, 2008) or genetically modified mouse (Castree, 2005). For management and organisation studies, 
innovative ANT approaches to animals call attention to the organisation of actor-networks that enact 
‘animals’ and the systems of rights, husbandry and domestication which are translated through 
networks of agency (Grasseni, 2005; Sage et al., 2016). The radical nature of ANT analyses is built 
around methodological concepts which provide researchers with tools ‘to help explicate, amplify, and 
link’, but which do not provide prescriptions regarding how we might understand the nature of the 
agency of any given actor, or make ‘substantive claims’ about the world (Sayes, 2014: 142). Below, we 




A CR perspective: opportunities for engagement 
The critique of ANT has come from a variety of sources - not least within ANT itself (Latour, 1999; 
Callon, 1999). One critique, focused primarily on ANT’s ontological assumptions, has come most 
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strongly from CR (Mutch, 2002; Elder‐Vass, 2008; 2015). CR2 is a stratified, emergent ontology which 
commits to a distinction between the transitive domain (loosely epistemology) and intransitive 
domain (loosely ontology) (Bhaskar, 1979) and, in doing so, distinguishes between the real (underlying 
causal mechanisms), actual (events) and empirical (perceptions and senses of the actual). CR holds 
that ‘entities…exist independently of us, and we are capable of performing acts of reference in which 
we treat them as independent, while also recognizing that the concepts we use to understand and 
explain them are products of human endeavour’ (Elder-Vass, 2015: 115). For critical realists, the 
powers of an entity depend on its essences. This equates to a ‘moderate’ form of essentialism (Sayer, 
1997), which is neither necessarily reductionist nor determinist (O’Mahoney, 2012), but affords 
explanatory power as to why entities act in some ways and not others.  
 
CR’s approach to explanation is fallibilist and relativist (Al-Amoudi & Willmott 2011). First, because 
the knowledge we mobilise to make sense of the world is inherently a social and historical 
construction. Second, because explaining (i.e. identifying causal mechanisms) proceeds through two 
highly fallible approaches: Abduction consists in developing ‘the most plausible description of the 
mechanisms that caused the [empirical] events… often in tandem with [extant] theory’ (O'Mahoney 
and Vincent, 2014: 17). Retroduction seeks to ascertain what the world must be like in order for our 
observations to be as they are and not otherwise. Both abduction and retroduction seek the most 
plausible explanation, while recognising alternative candidates, rather than absolute certainty.  
 
Emergence, in CR, explains the apparition of novel entities (including powers) resulting from the 
interaction of pre-existing entities. The resulting picture is (metaphorically) deep as it locates 
emergent entities at a ‘higher’ level than the ‘lower’ level entities from which they emerge. For 
example, minds emerge from brains that emerge from cells. A much discussed emergent relationship 
in CR concerns actors and social structures which are both ontologically distinct and mutually 
dependent upon, though irreducible to, one another. The powers of actors depend (in part) on the 
structural relations in which they engage (e.g. bees’ power to produce honey emerges from their 
belonging to a colony). And conversely, agents’ activities continuously reproduce and transform the 
structure of relations (e.g. colonies would dissolve if bees ceased producing honey over a long period). 
 
As most applications of ANT reject essentialism, social structure, and the distinction between ontology 
and epistemology, it is perhaps unsurprising that it has come under attack from critical realists on all 
                                                          
2 As with ANT, CR is also a broad church. Yet, ontologically variations have remained remarkably similar with a 
commitment to a stratified and emergent ontology, with entities possessing (potential) causal powers. It is upon 
these that this paper’s critique is built. 
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of these points (Mutch, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2015; 2008). Indeed, the tensions between a strict actualist 
ontology and the methodological necessities of research have caused the founders of ANT to accept 
some of these critiques (Callon, 1999), but to also called for analysts to avoid ‘throwing the baby out 
with the bath-water’ (Callon and Latour, 1992) - a call echoed by realists who find value in ANT’s 
empirical project but disagree with many of its metaphysical assumptions (Forsyth, 2001; McLean and 
Hassard, 2004). Yet, although it rejects the notion that the properties of an entity are constructed by 
the network in which it is embedded, CR has no issue with empirical networks per se – for CR, causal 
mechanisms occur at the level of the actual every time a power is realised. Indeed, one might go 
further and suggest that the empirical networks which ANT excels at identifying provide CR with 
opportunities to retroduce and abduct causal mechanisms which might allow a better understanding 
of why different entities (or actors) relate. Moreover, although ANT argues that structural and 
structurationist theories of ‘agency have tended to make much of the mediating character of the 
person, forgetting perhaps how many other things are also mediators’ (Shaw, 2013: 160), CR does not 
deny that non-human entities have powers to act, and thus what ANT would call ‘agency’. Although it 
is true that critical realists tend to depict agency as exclusively human, there is nothing in CR which 
militates against non-human agency. It is rather that when talking about the activities of non-human 
agents (for example labour markets or class conflict) realists tend to talk of the ‘causal powers of 
entities’ rather than agency (Bhaskar, 1975).  
 
For its part, one charge raised against CR (and other structural ontologies) is that it often emphasises 
invisible social structures at the expense of the visible and empirical, and is thus often lacking 
adequate methodological tools for studying the material world (Cruickshank, 2004). Perhaps as a 
result, although CR has engaged with wider ecological debates (Dickens, 1992; Benton, 1993), it has 
remained silent on the topic of animals. Yet, as Elder-Vass and Mutch have argued, there is potential 
for CR, and other ontologies, to learn from the domain level devices and tools of ANT. For example, 
Elder-Vass (2008: 468) argues that ‘ANT’s techniques of tracing the connections at the level of 
individual actors have a great deal to contribute…critical realists need to do more of this’. For critical 
realists seeking to engage with ANT, ANT’s actualism is a positive because it means that its theoretical 
devices tend to focus at the level of the ‘actual’ – and thus are compatible with one domain of the CR 
ontology.  
 
Given this potential for congruence, if not synergy, our paper seeks to explore the relations of human 
and non-human actors in the socio-ecological world by engaging an ANT methodology with a CR 
ontology. To achieve this, after briefly detailing our methods, we first provide an ANT reading of the 
8 
 
case of the Caretta caretta and then assess the effectiveness of this, and argue that CR can help 
ameliorate the weaknesses we identify. 
 
Methodology 
The data for this case comprises ethnographic material from a sea-turtle protection organisation in 
Greece - ARCHELON. This involved 116 semi-structured interviews with 67 volunteers and one of the 
author’s participant observation in a full 19-week volunteer ‘season’, with this data augmented by 
observations acquired through a further 15 weeks as a volunteer and 9 weeks as a researcher spanning 
the last decade. Participant observation entailed the researcher engaging in various activities: 
conservation work, the social and domestic interactions within camp, and interactions with local 
populations, tourists, and, of course, the turtles. Detailed notes were recorded as points of interest 
were observed. During the interviews data were also collected concerning volunteers’ age, sex, social 
class and educational background. 
 
In addition, a variety of documents were also reviewed. These included journal publications from 
ARCHELON, EU environmental reports, newspaper reports, EU legal proceedings, and publications 
from various NGOs related to the case. These were reviewed to identify the networks which helped 
trace the data collected by volunteers, through the reports and lobbying by ARCHELON, and 
subsequent legal decisions at an EU level. A number of reports and papers from ARCHELON and other 
organisations were examined to shed further light on sea-turtle activities in the region. In addition, 
we contacted, by email and phone, three researchers who contributed to reports which were used by 
the Council of Europe’s ‘Standing Committee on the Bern Convention on the Conservation of 
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats’ (‘the Bern Convention’). These were used to clarify exactly 
how data was collated, transmitted and used for decision-making. 
 
An inductive anthropological approach was taken towards participant observation, with ideas 
emerging throughout the data collection process, rather than being led by theoretical concerns. 
However, following a CR approach (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2015) we used retroduction to identify gaps 
in the ANT accounts of networks, especially in response to why questions (for example, why is the 
local Mayor so important to the scientific network? Why do volunteers tend to be white, middle class 
Western females? Why do people volunteer at all?). Abduction (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014) was 
then used to connect these gaps to extant theorising, not just concerning ANT-CR debates, but also in 




The following section commences with an ANT-inspired ethnographic account of the journey of the 




The Journeys of the Caretta caretta  
The Caretta caretta has existed for around twenty million years and for much of that time, has been 
returning annually to nest on the beaches of the Mediterranean. To navigate to the same beaches year 
after year, these sea-turtles read the magnetic field of the earth. One night in June 2013, one female 
turtle uses her flippers to make her way onto a beach and begins digging in the sand. After a while, 
when sufficient depth is reached, she lays around 100 small white eggs. The sand allows this activity 
as it has the suitable combination of coarseness and wetness to support a ‘chamber’ in which the eggs 
can be housed. 
 
Whilst the turtle is laying, she enters the field of vision of two volunteers from ARCHELON, the Sea-
Turtle Protection Society of Greece. ARCHELON has trained the volunteers, provided equipment for 
them to use, prescribed many activities which they undertake, and provided roles for the leadership 
and governance of the project. With the volunteers are a tape measure, callipers, a ‘gun’ which inserts 
a transponder into the turtle’s shoulder, a number of transponders, a transponder scanner, marker 
pens, a notebook, biro, livestock tags, and an applicator which attaches these tags to the turtle. The 
watchers have come from a beach-side camp, which houses around 20 other volunteers, and is 
occupied for the whole turtle ‘season’, from mid-May until the end of September.  
 
When the turtle has finished laying, she buries the eggs in the sand ready to begin her journey back to 
the sea. However, before the turtle’s return journey can be completed, the volunteers and the 
equipment begin their work: the turtle is measured and a pen marks its dimensions into a notebook 
along with the location of the nest. As she has no identification tags on her, the volunteers, the 
livestock applicator, and the PIT ‘gun’ attach internal and external tags identifying the turtle should 
she appear again in the future. When the intervention is complete, she completes her journey, leaving 
imprints of her flippers as she moves. The turtle re-enters the sea, where she will remain until she next 
nests. The nest is marked with bamboo, lengths of which litter the area, and the volunteers continue 




The next morning, before the sun has risen over the mountains, the tracks left by the turtle and her 
marked nest attract the attention of three more volunteers. Enacting the training that they have been 
given, the volunteers and their equipment cover the nest with a metal grid, and bamboo stakes are 
hammered in around its perimeter. These stakes hold the grid in place, thwarting attempts at 
predation by foxes and dogs. A sign is affixed to this bamboo which, in Greek, English and German, 
states that the nest is protected by EU law. When their work is completed, geo-location equipment 
records the location of the nest, the data is written in the notebook, and the volunteers continue along 
the beach. 
 
Although the turtle has returned to the sea, she leaves behind at least two significant traces which 
now begin their own journeys - the first of which are the marks made by the pens on the notebooks. 
These numerical representations make an ambitious trip, first from notebooks back to the beach camp. 
Here, a spreadsheet asks the volunteers for the geo-location of the nest, the relative position on the 
beach, the distance of the nest from the sea, the depth of the top egg, and, if the nest had been 
relocated, the number of eggs in the nest. At the end of the season, after hundreds of entries, the 
completed spreadsheet comprising these data is emailed to ARCHELON headquarters in Athens, where 
it is combined with spreadsheets from all the other project areas. Analyses of the compiled data then 
travel to the computers of various academics and environmentalists around the world and are 
translated into reports, plans and papers which have their own journeys to make. In late 2013, one 
such file arrives on the computer used by a researcher working for MEDASSET (the Mediterranean 
Association to Save the Sea-Turtles). Here, it is combined with other data and text into a report which 
is passed via email to various places, two of which we can highlight here. 
 
The first destination for the report is the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the 
body that determines the risk classification of different species, and which classified the Caretta 
caretta as ‘endangered’ in 1996. This classification is important because the organisation is a source of 
information for key legislative bodies such as the UN and the EU. The second is the Council of Europe’s 
Bern Convention. At the end of 2013, data collected by ARCHELON (and other organisations) is 
projected onto a screen at the Bern Committee’s annual meeting in Strasbourg (Bern, 2014), and in 
early 2014 ‘Recommendation No. 174’ is emailed to the Council of Europe (EC 2014), noting the 
continuation of illegal building and other contraventions to EU. At this point, we should note that a 
previous actor-network in the 1980s had resulted in the Greek government becoming a signatory to 
the Bern Convention, and, in 1983, changing its laws to protect nesting sites from new development, 
removing illegal buildings and roads, limiting the use of boats and fishing in the area, protecting 
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beaches from over-use and limiting the deployment of beach furniture and light pollution 
(Dimopoulos, 2001). Shortly after receiving Recommendation No. 174, the Council of Europe initiates 
court action against the Greek government for failing to ‘provide adequate protection’ for sea-turtles, 
resulting in a judgement that ‘unless the Greek Government takes clear steps to prevent further 
damage … a conviction will result in heavy financial penalties’ (European Commission, 2014).  
 
Yet from this point, our network begins to peter out, as further activity is marked by its absence rather 
than its presence. The network one might expect to focus on, the enforcement of Greek national law 
at the local level, simply does not occur, and we can perhaps learn why if we consider a (more opaque) 
actor-network that connects the local Mayor, the police, the beach, and our volunteers. What we know 
of this network is that the buildings (which are constructed illegally on the beach by developers), 
trucks, and various equipment, which disrupt the nesting turtles, are rarely visited by inspectors or law 
enforcement officers. A key actor in enabling this is the local mayor, who fails to direct the police in 
enforcing Greek environmental law. Indeed, two mayors of areas in which Caretta caretta nest were 
taken to court in 2006 and 2007 for ‘authorizing unlicensed construction’ on local beaches (ARCHELON, 
2012: 4). We can also point to a decree issued by one Mayor banning ARCHELON volunteers from 
certain tourist areas where they were conducting education activities, and to the strong family and 
social networks which exist between decision-makers and business interests, especially in rural Greece 
(Charalampēs et al., 2004). As much of this network is opaque to us, we can perhaps stop here and 
instead pick up on the second of the traces our female turtle leaves behind: her eggs.  
 
As the nest which our turtle dug remains undisturbed, and the temperature is suitable for the 
development of the eggs, most of these eggs hatch, 55 days later, translating into hatchlings that try 
to make their way to the sea. Other nests were less fortunate: vibrations from illegal building work or 
the movement of tourists caused some to hatch early and die in the sand. Others, despite the efforts 
of the grid, the bamboo and the volunteers, are dug up by foxes and dogs. Others still, despite having 
hatched successfully, have their hatchlings eaten by birds or other predators, or caught in beach 
furniture. Some hatchlings that evaded these threats are killed because they are disorientated by the 
lights of beach-side hotels, and head inland towards the road where they are crushed by cars or die 
from dehydration. Others get caught in tyre-tracks from vehicles illegally using the beach and thus 
journey in the wrong direction until they too expire. The risks to these hatchlings are so great that only 
around one in a thousand will each sexual maturity. Yet despite these dangers, a handful of our 
hatchlings do make it to the sea, and some of these evade sea-borne predators, fishing nets and 
outboard motors. Yet from here, our network again disappears, for no-one knows where these 
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The potential of ANT 
ANT allows us to trace three overlapping networks that ‘enact’ different turtles (Figure 1). First, we 
have a ‘scientific’ network, which is our main focus, which follows the translations of the nesting turtle, 
into marks in the notebook, and then into a spreadsheet, and then to the complete ARCHELON 
database, comprising these spreadsheets from various sites over many years. It is worth recalling here 
the argument of Yarrow (2008) that the structure of forms and templates have agency - they not only 
structure the agency of other actors, but also create the expectation of structuring: ‘eliciting thoughts 
and responses that were not straightforwardly their own’ (p.130). This might also be argued of the 
annual databases compiled by ARCHELON from the individual spreadsheets sent by project leaders, 
and annual reports that are compiled by MEDASSET, which follow a regular structure and format, 
regardless of who ‘authors’ them. From here, the network takes us to the deliberation and outcomes 
of the Bern Convention, which themselves follow a highly routinized and structured format, and the 
translation of these outcomes through various means into Greek law. This network not only seeks to 
enact the turtle as legally endangered and thus in need of protection against the activities of touristic 
development, but also seeks to create the measurements in the notepads as the ‘obligatory point of 
passage’ through which action in the network is defined. However, as this network has failed to enrol 
the local Mayor, there is no route for this actor-network to achieve its aim. 
 
Through community ties, the mayor is instead enrolled in a second, ‘development’ network which 
attempts to enact a turtle that is secondary to concerns of building development and tourism. For this 
network, the turtle is ideally invisible (i.e. not part of the network) and to all intents and purposes has 
been rendered as such by the failure of the Mayor to prompt the police to enforce European and Greek 
national laws. This is perhaps the opposite of the ‘interessement’ by which actor-networks engage 
actors (e.g. Callon, 1986). Here, we have a dis-interessement – a disengagement of an actor from a 
network, whereby the turtle is both unseen and rendered unimportant.  
 
A final overlapping ‘reproductive’ network is the one in which the Caretta caretta has participated for 
20 million years. This network sees the translation of eggs into hatchlings into mature turtles, and the 
agency of the sea, the beach, and magnetic fields to enable this annual cycle. This is the network of 
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which we know least, as no-one knows what happens to the hatchlings after they disappear into the 
sea. Yet, dogs and foxes, vehicles, hotel lights, tourists, and even volunteers are also co-producers of 
turtle populations. Moreover, whilst the development network seeks to disengage the turtle, its 
consequences, in the form of beach-side furniture, vibrations and tyre tracks also have a consequence 
for turtle numbers. 
 
ANT’s method of mapping out the different empirical inter-related networks in which the turtle 
participates is powerful in providing an answer to our question, can the Caretta caretta survive? The 
reproductive network is obviously crucial in the survival of the turtle, but this in turn is impacted 
deleteriously by the development network, which is restrained (albeit imperfectly) by the scientific 
network. It is the failure of the latter to enrol the Mayor (and thus the subsequent network) that is 
central to the existential threat faced by the sea-turtle. This positioning of the turtle as contested 
between three actor-networks shows how its different ‘enactments’ are contingent upon a number of 
actors connecting and acting in specific ways: if nests are not protected, the data are not collected, the 
developers do not build, or the emails are not sent, the networks we have described change, and the 
turtles may or may not survive as a result. Moreover, in contrast to many ANT studies of scientific 
networks (Callon, 1986; Latour et al., 1993) we can also see how the key obligatory point of passage 
for the enrolment (and thus survival) of the turtle is less the measurements of the scientists (although 
these are important), but more the Mayor’s failure to translate central conservation law into local 




























The ANT perspective on the survival of the Caretta caretta also highlights the agency of non-humans 
and the decentering of human agency from its descriptive accounts. If we ask who are the authors of 
the acts which make a difference in this case, restricting the answer to ‘humans’ provides a very limited 
understanding. At the very least, two of these networks depend on the turtle for their very existence: 
its annual pilgrimage, its tracks, nests and eggs. To a great extent, it is the agency of the turtle that sets 
the rhythms of life for the volunteers. When and where it nests, the tracks it makes, the number of 
nests it creates and the eggs it lays, structure where the volunteers live, what they do, when they do 
it, and even what they talk about. Upon the back of this creature an edifice is created through a series 
of translations, first to the numbers measuring its dimensions, nests, and hatchlings, and then to a long 
network of activities, stretching from our Greek beach to the EC in Brussels. Remove the turtle and the 
reproductive and conservation networks collapse (although the development network may flourish 
further).  
 
Moreover, the turtle is no predictable automaton but is, rather, a mediator whose translations enact 
others. Agency elsewhere in the networks, for example EU legislation, depends on the indeterminacy 
of questions such as ‘how many hatchlings make it to maturity?’. For Latour (2007: 202) the presence 
of these chains of agency means that ‘the whole set up, no matter how solemn or controlled, may 
become unpredictable’ (p.202). Additionally, the turtle, and its translations, are acted upon by a 
number of other actors, from foxes and dogs, to notebooks and committees. This does not just concern 
the co-production of turtle numbers, but the enactment of a large part of what the turtle is – whether 
it is more or less valuable than tourism, and, through the IUCN, whether it is classified as ‘endangered’ 
or not.  
 
At a more general level, the ANT perspective highlighted to the authors the extent to which taken-for-
granted language in academia (and presumably elsewhere) reflects and constructs anthropocentric 
accounts of agency, especially concerning the relationship between humans, materiality and nature. 
Using different descriptions often reads awkwardly, but shifts the focus of researchers from the human 
to the non-human. Some example of rewritten terminology are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Examples of ethnographic vs ANT case descriptions  
 
Ethnographic account ANT account 
‘the volunteers’ equipment’ ‘the equipment with the volunteers’ 
‘the volunteers live in camp’ ‘the camp houses volunteers’ 
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‘she is observed by two volunteers’ ‘she enters the field of vision of two volunteers’ 
‘the volunteers use a gun and a livestock 
applicator to tag the turtle’ 
‘the volunteers, the livestock applicator, and the 
gun attach internal and external tags’ 
‘volunteers walk along the beach looking for nest 
markers’ 
‘the marked nest attracts the attention of three 
more volunteers’ 
 
Such differences mark a subtle shift away from anthropocentric accounts by shifting the attention of 
the researcher towards the ‘agency’ of entities which play a greater part in the story. Such a role is 
often revelatory, as one realises that it is not simply a turtle that does not lay which may disrupt the 
network, but equally, a pen that does not work, a volunteer that oversleeps, or an email that gets lost. 
The taken for granted or ‘black-boxed’ network that links changes in turtle populations to conservation 
efforts is potentially precarious. Moreover, the crafting of these agentic accounts highlights the 
participation and enactment of the researchers and their own texts in the network (Latour, 1987). 
 
Issues with ANT 
 
Using the ANT methodology has been of great value in providing a non-anthropocentric account of 
how the three actor-networks contest and enact different turtles. However, its powers are also limited 
in answering our question How can the Caretta caretta survive? The first issue here concerns the 
boundaries of the network. If all actors are treated symmetrically, then it is difficult to find entities 
that should not be included in the network (Elder‐Vass, 2008). In the case presented above, the actors 
that are depicted in Figure 1 were perceived by the authors as the important actors. However, if we 
were to be strict ANTs we might have included the crab that the turtle ate, the silty sand in which the 
crabs foraged, and the countless entities which were involved in making the silt. Although drawing 
boundaries is a challenge for all perspectives, the ANT commitment to the ‘symmetry’ of actors and 
the primacy of events, makes this especially problematic if all actors and events are held to be equally 
important to network construction3. The de facto approach the authors of this paper took to focusing 
on some actors rather than others was on the basis of their potential powers to make a difference, 
which appeared to be a necessary deviation from ANT. Yet, this problem is also evident within ANT 
accounts of animals themselves. For example, in Callon (1986), Law and Mol (2008), Latour et al. 
(1993) and Castree (2005), the actors which gain the researchers’ attention (other than the animals 
                                                          
3 Latour’s distinction between mediators and intermediaries does not help here, as almost everything that one 
might notice has the potential to unpredictably change the network, and thus be classed as a mediator. The 
ambiguity of mediator / intermediary is something Latour accepts (2007:39). 
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themselves) are those that have more power to act (e.g. researchers, vets, farmers, governments and 
universities).  
 
The second issue concerns regularities. We find a number of cyclical, persistent patterns such as the 
visiting turtles, the production of MEDASSET reports, the visiting of tourists every summer, and even 
the building of the beach-side volunteer camp. We also find a number of social patterns, for example, 
that volunteers are most commonly young (a mean age of 23), middle-class4 (63%), and female (75%) 
– and that these trends are replicated each year. Moreover, whilst some actors fade away when they 
have been enacted (for example, the turtle nest), others are relatively persistent such as ARCHELON, 
MEDASSET and the European Council. Such temporal and spatial persistence generates difficulties for 
an actualist ontology which treats entities as events. Although when considering organisations, Latour 
speaks of networks which ‘have constantly to be made, or remade, and during this creation or 
recreation the group-makers leave behind many traces that can be used as data’ (2007: 34), this 
remaking cannot explain why there is such persistence in rules, legal forms and routines: ‘Latour grants 
no initial principle to endurance over time, just as he accepts no force of temporal flux over and above 
specific actors themselves…. time is produced by the labour of actors’ (Harman, 2009: 105). As Elder-
Vass puts it, ‘ANT’s refusal to theorize structural stability must count as one of its gravest weaknesses; 
much of contemporary society may well be fluid, but there are still massive stabilities, over a variety 
of time frames, which are enormously important in contemporary society’ (2010: 461).  
 
The third issue concerns a priori theorising5. ANT explicitly rejects a priori theorising and seeks instead 
to identify actor-networks by following the actors (Callon 1986: 200; Latour 1992; Sayes 2014). The 
implications of such an epistemology are radical, necessitating the rejection of prior assumptions of 
the researcher, or indeed the insights and theories previous research might have developed. Yet, in 
our attempt to replicate this method we ran into a significant challenge in linking two or more 
empirical events. Why, for example, should the email which arrives on the MEDASSET researcher be 
linked with their subsequent use of that email, rather than say, the researcher eating their lunch, or 
indeed, the sun coming up the next day? Without an a priori theory (however implicit) of how events 
and actors are linked, we found we had little basis for identifying an actor-network.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Based upon the parental occupation as a proxy measure. Class is based upon the National statistics Socio-
economic Classification system (Ns-Sec 2014). 
 
5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for inspiring our argument on a priori theorising. 
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The final issue concerns absence. An actualist ontology has no place for things that do not act: ‘for 
Latour….if it acts, it is an actor leaving traces that can be followed; if it does not act, it does not matter 
and has no place in the description’ (McGee, 2014: 25); or more poetically ‘if a dancer stops dancing, 
the dance is finished’ (Latour, 2005: 37). Yet, our case is full of absences that make a difference, and 
thus imply a form of action. The absence of eggs translating into mature adults prompts action on 
behalf of volunteers, whilst the absence of action by the local Mayor contributed to the fining of the 
Greek government by the EC. Moreover, absence appears intrinsically related to potential as it is the 
perceived potential of volunteers’ action to make a difference to turtle numbers, the potential of the 
Greek government to be fined by the EU, and the potential of the Mayor to prevent beach 
encroachment, which makes them important. However, as ANT commits to an anti-essentialist 
position which denies potential as an ontological category (Lee and Hassard, 1999), it makes discussion 
of potential highly problematic. An actor-network theorist might counter that any absence that makes 
a difference counts as action and thus should be incorporated into an ANT analysis. However, the key 
question is ‘an absence of what?’. Without an ontological acceptance of potential, one is forced into 
a position where all absences of everything make a difference: the absence of Mayoral action cannot 
be argued to be more important than the absence of a crustacean. 
 
Thus, whilst the ANT methodology is insightful, the limitations of its ontology cause difficulties in 
generating the explanations which are necessary in understanding how the Caretta caretta can 
survive. Indeed, it is problematic for any actualist ontology to adequately answer a question 
concerning the future because actualism necessarily excludes events that have not yet happened, as 
well as the ‘invisible’ explanatory factors (e.g. logics, mechanisms, and social structures) which can 
provide temporal stability (Cummins, 2000). Indeed, Latour accepts some of these limitations and 
‘very deliberately seeks to elide “how” and “why” questions’ (Bijker and Law, 1992: 291). Yet, in our 
case, the questions ‘why do volunteers volunteer?’, ‘why do volunteers tend to be female?’ or ‘why 
does the Mayor allow building on the beach?’ generate very different, and less adequate or 
sociologically interesting answers, than if one replaces the ‘why’ with a ‘how’. To answer our empirical 
question, then, we need to look beyond the networks identified, not by expanding the boundaries of 
the study to include more empirical ‘actors’ (such as crustaceans, or plankton), but instead by 







Ontological reframing: a CR alternative? 
The argument we make here is that the ontological commitments of CR are loosely compatible with 
the ANT methodology, and help overcome the weaknesses identified above. This allows us to provide 
a more complex and more thorough response to our empirical question, but has certain 
methodological and ontological implications. Therefore, this ‘appropriation’ of ANT methodology 
requires a brief explanation. As CR’s ontology is emergent and stratified rather than flat or 
monovalent, it can accept and distinguish between a variety of things that make a difference in our 
case: not just the empirical events that occur, but the processes that cause them to occur, the talk and 
work or the volunteers, researchers, and politicians, as well as the organisations and governance 
systems which co-ordinate this work. Unlike some philosophical positions which prioritise one 
methodology (e.g. discourse or regression analysis), ‘there are no specifically CR methods….. from a 
CR perspective there is a valid and important place for all the methods sociologists have employed - 
although not necessarily in the way that they have employed them’ (Porpora, 2015: 63). CR, therefore, 
is potentially compatible with the methodological, though not the ontological, commitments of ANT.  
 
As detailed earlier, CR adheres to an essentialist, emergent and stratified ontology which, by 
retroducing and abducting the findings facilitated by the ANT methodology, can generate explanations 
and help ameliorate the four limitations identified above. To take boundaries first, actors in CR are 
not symmetrical and have properties that define their potential powers. This not only places 
constraints on what an entity can do (e.g. turtles might reproduce, swim or die), but also allows some 
entities to play a more significant role than others. This helps us define the important actors by 
identifying their potential powers, which remain invisible in an ANT ontology. For example, the local 
Mayor is important to the scientific network because of the potential power accorded to him by his 
role in the Greek governance structure to instruct the police to prevent beach developments. Potential 
powers are those that an entity might, given an appropriate context, actualise – an actualised power 
is one empirical instance of an array of potential powers. 
 
The concept of social structure also helps us understand the regularities with which ANT struggles. 
ARCHELON, for example, is a (relatively) persistent legal entity which structures persistent relations 
between agents, positions and practices (Bhaskar 1979: 40-1). These relations, constitutive of a 
structure, are real and powerful as they enable and constrain actors’ powers. Thus, the importance of 
the local mayor and EU policy makers is not arbitrary, but derives from the powers granted to them 
by their position in their respective organisational structures. Social structures also help us explain 
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why many volunteers have upper-middle class backgrounds6 (Author 2015). When asked in interviews 
why they were involved, many talked about their ‘future careers’ and ‘CV enhancement’. Through 
abduction and retroduction with reference to prior theorising we can postulate that volunteer 
concerns with employability are embedded within modern capitalist structures (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005). As others have argued, ‘volunteering’ generates cultural capital which distinguishes 
individuals from other classes, and contributes to the reproduction of social stratification (Pearlin and 
Kohn, 1966; Bourdieu, 1986). Moreover, concern with environmental issues such as conservation has 
been shown to be strongly associated with young, upper-middle class mores (Urry, 2002), as has the 
propensity to engage in volunteer tourism (Simpson, 2004). These structures therefore provide a 
partial explanation for the question of why these actors volunteer and not others. Empirical 
regularities are not only the result of the causal powers of social structures, but also the consequence 
of the powers of actors and other entities. For example, in seeking to understand the ongoing 
presence of volunteers, we can retroduce from a variety of data (both in this case and elsewhere) that 
the properties of humans include the capacity to care (Sayer, 2011; Archer, 2000) - properties not 
possessed by, say, hotel lights. Thus, when asked about their motivations for volunteering, 
respondents cited altruistic and ethical reasons alongside the instrumental motivations detailed 
above. To be sure, the target of care (i.e. turtles as opposed to say germs) is very much a product of 
social mores, but it is the capacity for care that contributes to (though not determines) the ongoing 
pattern of volunteering.  
 
This also illustrates the CR response to the challenge of a priori theorising. In contrast to ANT, CR is 
explicit about using a priori theorising, and thus does not encounter the same challenges in connecting 
two disparate events. For CR, events are related through the interaction of causal mechanisms with 
actors and other entities. The abduction and retroduction critical realists use to identify these 
mechanisms necessarily builds on the insights identified by other researchers, and helps us provide a 
fuller answer to the question of how the Caretta caretta can survive. Locating our case in broader 
discussions of, for example, social class, power, and environmental politics, help shed further light on 
the networks we describe. For instance, broader relations of power (which we refer to as social 
structures) explain why the mayor enjoys prerogatives that other citizens lack, or why middle class 
volunteers are in a better position than those from less privileged backgrounds to spend their summer 
participating to charity work in Greece. Yet a priori theorising is insufficient by itself as new knowledge 
and prompts for further explanation are prompted by contradictions between expected observations 
                                                          
6 Largely based upon the parental occupation as a proxy measure due to the age/life stage of most of the 
volunteers. Class is based upon the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification system (NS-SEC 2014).  
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and actual observations. For example, if turtle numbers increased despite growing beach-side 
development, or if the Mayor decided to volunteer with ARCHELON, these new facts would prompt 
further attention and explanation. 
 
Finally, CR helps us with the absences in this case. Absences in CR are important, not only because the 
presence of an absence makes a difference (Bhaskar, 2008) but also because actors often base their 
action on the potential powers of another actor, or (in the case of our volunteers) their own power to 
potentially make a difference by preventing a potential absence of turtles. The mayor, unlike a 
volunteer, not only has the power to prohibit local infringements of the law, but crucially also has 
power to ignore them, thus making him a target for lobbying efforts by both developers and 
volunteers. The EU, unlike ARCHELON, has the potential power to fine the Greek government for not 
protecting Natura 2000 zones, and thus it is this organisation to which reports are targeted. 
Methodologically, the absence of an exercised power points to something that needs explaining. For 
example, the failure of the mayor to exert his potential powers to prosecute developers nudges the 
researcher towards further (often retroductive) analysis – perhaps into the strong local personal ties 
that are found in many Mediterranean cultures, or the relationship between tourism and the recession 
in Greece.  
 
This emphasis on possibilities also helps with the ‘absurd’ (McLean and Hassard, 2004) treatment of 
different enactments of actors as creating different entities (for example, Law and Mol 2008). For 
critical realists, the properties of a turtle are distinct from its discursive construction or its network 
enactment, meaning that the same animal can be part of different networks without needing to be 
presented as actual different animals. Thus, in CR, unlike ANT, the enrolment of actors into a network 
does not change their essential properties: even if a turtle were elected mayor7, it would not possess 
the properties and powers (say, reflexivity, communication, imagination and memory) to allow it to 
act in the same capacity as a human (Collins, 2010b). In our case, this definition of properties is useful 





In answer to the question how can the Caretta caretta survive? we use an ANT methodology to trace 
three networks of which the turtle is a part, and note that the ‘missing link’ is the local Mayor’s 
                                                          
7 This is not entirely implausible. In 2002, a monkey was elected mayor of Hartlepool, England. 
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instruction to the police to limit the development network. From an ANT perspective, the survival of 
the sea-turtles depend on the Mayor being enrolled into to scientific network, or an alternative actor 
found that can equally retard the development network. Yet, whilst ANT’s extortion to ‘follow the 
actors’ provided a useful methodological tool, its underpinning ontology was impossible to sustain for 
the researchers, who ran up against difficulties of identifying network boundaries, explaining 
persistence, rejecting a priori theorising and conceptualising important absences.  
 
To address these tensions, we have suggested embedding the ANT methodology within a CR ontology. 
This argument is important for two reasons. First, because it allows researchers to trace actor-
networks without internal inconsistencies. As we saw, adopting a flat ontology rules out reliance on 
knowledge held by the researcher about events, actors, and how they relate. Our approach, instead, 
consisted in mobilising an ANT methodology within a CR ontology and epistemology that recognises 
the (limited) validity of research and observations produced before the present study. Second, 
because it allows the researcher to shift the temporal focus of the research question from describing 
how existing sea-turtles survive in the empirical present, to exploring how sea-turtles might survive in 
the future – both temporalities are implied by our original question, but ANT answers only one. The 
use of a CR ontology means that we can move beyond describing the current network and suggest 
potential mechanisms for making changes to these networks in order to save the Caretta caretta. 
Identifying these mechanisms requires us to abduct and retroduct, drawing on literature about 
parallel cases, and imaging the consequences of change, in order to understand how the world might 
change. 
 
From this realist perspective, we can suggest that in order for the Caretta caretta to survive, a number 
of potential powers might be enacted that would provide the sea-turtle with a more promising future. 
This involves exploring the potential powers of actors (such as people, organisations, or roles) to use 
mechanisms (such as education, regulatory change, or persuasion) to achieve potential outcomes. For 
example, EC institutions may lobby the Greek government to change Mayoral governance structures; 
volunteers might educate local tourists to make more environmentally friendly choices when choosing 
hotels and bars, or may seek to convince hoteliers of the touristic value of the turtles; ARCHELON 
might seek to raise revenue from their middle-class volunteers (and their families) to further their 
lobbying and protection activities; the Greek government might change the governance of 
environmental policing or increase fines associated with illegal activity. Each of these identifies an 




The methodological consequences of combining CR with ANT are significant. Researchers taking our 
approach would take the lead of ANT in following the network, problematising taken-for-granted 
categories, and rejecting anthropocentrism. However, in using critical realism as a base, researchers 
need reject neither a priori theorising (either their own, or prior research) nor the retroductive 
question of why might things be this way rather than another (Lawson et al., 2007; O'Mahoney and 
Vincent, 2014). Thus, as we saw with our own example, the CR use of ANT is likely to not only provide 
descriptions of actors (human and non-human) and the ways in which the relate (causal powers), but 
also to provide an idea of why this is the case with reference (perhaps) to social structures, potential 
powers, similar cases and prior research. Yet, an actor-network theorist may reply that the 
appropriation of ANT methods and terms by a CR ontology changes their meaning, rendering ANT 
unrecognisable to its adherents. Although we accept that some shift in meaning is inevitable, our 
commitment is not to maintaining the philosophical purity of ANT, but to developing a better 
understanding of the socio-ecological world. We position ourselves with those sociologists who argue 
not only that ontological dialogue and commensurability is possible, but also that this is necessary for 
good social research (Gorman, 2010). ANT itself has been applied with considerable theoretical 
variation, and even its founders (e.g. Callon (1999); Callon and Latour (1992) have called for its 
development especially in dialogue with other disciplines. Indeed, Latour calls for researchers to ‘use 
[ANT], to distort it beyond recognition, or, most likely, to drop it altogether’ (2005: x). We see our 
work as responding to such calls. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has explored the potential of ANT in answering how can the Caretta caretta survive? Our 
empirical contribution uses an ANT methodology to trace three networks that are important in 
describing how turtles survive, highlighting the contested nature of the turtle, and identifying actors 
that are important in enabling this to happen. However, we found also that the ontological 
commitments of ANT caused four explanatory issues, concerning network boundaries, regularities, a 
priori theorising and potentials/absences, which prohibited the development of a satisfactory answer 
to this question. As Sayes suggests, then, we have adopted ANT as ‘a useful starting point for providing 
a proper rendition of the complexity of the associations we forms with others and with non-humans’ 
(2014: 145), and CR has provided us a means of moving beyond this to theorise these relations.  
 
Our engagement of CR and ANT allows us to move beyond the description of how sea-turtles survive 
now, to providing a richer account of how the sea-turtles may survive in the future if certain 
mechanisms are actualised. We have built upon existing work seeking to engage ANT and CR (Mutch 
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2002; Elder-Vass 2008; 2015) in three ways. First, we provided an empirical, socio-ecological 
illustration of the potential for such an endeavour. Second, this empirical illustration provided us with 
new theoretical insights: the critiques of a priori theorising and absences / potentials in ANT, and their 
amelioration with critical realism, are new to the literature. Finally, unlike many CR accounts, we also 
seek to use ANT to highlight the deficiencies in many applied CR accounts, such as the assumption of 
solely human agency and the tendency to side-line the empirical.  
 
The combination of ANT and CR points to the potential for future research in other areas. Whilst the 
agency of animals, and the socio-ecological realm more widely has obvious potential, other areas such 
as information technology and (socio) materiality may also benefit from an empirical use of the 
approach we have illustrated here. There are a number of limitations in this paper that also point to 
potential future avenues for research. The first is that we lack the space to develop a more 
sophisticated account of a CR engagement with non-human actors. There are outstanding questions 
concerning if, and how, emergent properties might arise from their interactions, and the extent to 
which human / non-human relations might differ from purely human relations as they participate in 
the transformation or reproduction of social and cultural structures (Archer 2000). In addition, ANT 
highlights the performative effects of the ‘transitive’ dimension of knowledge: in our case, how the 
counting and representation of turtles has real effects, not just elsewhere in the network, but on the 
meanings associated with turtles themselves. This raises a challenge for critical realists who often 
claim epistemological relativism, but claim to know (or know better) the ‘real’ world. The ambiguous 
and intentionally counter-intuitive language of ANT offers an opportunity for seeing the world in a 
different way – but we see this opportunity as more methodological than theoretical (Sayes, 2014). 
We hope these and other challenges may be taken up by those interested in developing the 
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